The Russian parliamentary elections of December 1995 have dealt a crushing blow to Yeltsin’s Government. Two die-hard opponents of economic reform, Communists led by Zyuganov and an extreme nationalist party of Zhirinovsky, have emerged as the top vote-getters with 22% and 11 % of the popular vote, respectively. The weak showing of reformist parties – the pro-Yeltsin bloc headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the independent Y abloko party led by Y avlinsky – has resulted in a Parliament dominated by hard-line opposition.
The outcome is clearly a setback for Russia’s social and economic development. The “Z and Z” parties, as Western observers were quick to dub them, intend to pursue a policy of “four R’s”: reversal of privatization, return to state-dominated economy, restoration of the Soviet empire, and retrenchment against the spread of Western cultural and economic influence.
The electoral strength of hard-line opposition is hardly shocking. Western Europe has seen disgruntled voters tum out in even greater numbers: French Communists received over 25% of the vote at the peak of their popularity, while Italian Communists once enjoyed the support of one-third of the voters. Similarly, the popularity of extreme nationalism and populism is not a new phenomenon. Hitler and Mussolini were not aberrations. Today’s educated European electorates continue to lend support to the likes of Le Pen in France and Haider in Austria. In the United States, protest voters have found their idol in Perot, who received 19% of the votes in 1992.
The success of extremists at the polls across the world is due in part to voters’ resentment of mainstream parties, and in part to the fact that extremists are raising legitimate (yet highly controversial) issues, such as immigration, that traditional parties dare not touch. As voters cease to recognize their bread-and-butter issues in mainstream political platforms, they rebel against the rigid bipolar party system that no longer adequately represents their interests.
In sum, the cumulative 33% support for left-wing and nationalist movements is not big news per se; what is shocking, though, is the weak support for capitalism-oriented parties which advocate continued reform. How could this happen? The answer lies in Russia’s social and economic crisis of 1985-1995 and its origins.
I.
WHAT WAS PERESTROIKA ALL ABOUT?
A simplistic version of modem Russian history, as told by Western analysts, can be synopsized in the following manner:
- Before Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was an evil totalitarian empire that espoused Communism and sought to spread it around the world by violent means.
- The empire was ruled by a small elite (nomenklatura) of Communist Party functionaries, military and KGB officers, and industrial bosses. This upper class enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle, while the vast majority of common people were poor and trapped in a rigid class structure which offered no upward social mobility. The regime permitted little, if any, private enterprise to exist; virtually all property (land, industrial plants, natural resources) was owned by the state itself.
- In the 1980s, the Soviet economy began to crumble under the burden of huge budgetary expenditures devoted to a military industrial race with the West. While a victory in the race was nowhere in sight, the country faced increasing difficulties in meeting its basic needs.
- In 1985 Gorbachev took power. He adopted a policy of perestroika, or restructuring. Private enterprise and foreign investment were encouraged; the arms race and the doctrine of worldwide Communist revolution were scrapped; and totalitarian repression was gradually scaled back (release of political prisoners, reopening of emigration, increased freedom of speech for internal media, and end of jamming of Western radio broadcasts).
- Eventually the process of perestroika got out of Gorbachev’s control. Faced with the relentless assault of Big Macs and Coca-Cola, the Communist party relinquished power, Gorbachev stepped down, the Soviet empire collapsed, and democracy and capitalism blossomed.
The first point, while debatable, is beyond the scope of this essay. The second, third, and fourth points are essentially correct. The fifth point is a myth, and fails to analyze the true reasons for, and the results of, the perestroika process.
Its first fallacy is that true capitalism still does not exist in today’s Russia. The would-be entrepreneur is faced with archaic regulation and a devious bureaucracy, and must grease many palms if he wishes his business to prosper. He will also confront a powerful mafia, which will inevitably show up at the door and demand a percentage of his profits. The dream of the Western “self-made man”, who rises from rags to riches by pulling himself up by his own bootstraps with entrepreneurial wit, in Russia remains just that – a dream.
Second, the elite never truly relinquished power. When one looks at the numerous Russian stock markets and commodities exchanges, one sees eerily familiar faces of former KGB employees and Komsomol officials. Yesterday’s rulers became today’s millionaires. Having accumulated substantial financial resources during decades in power (and having never been forced to give up these assets), the nomenklatura got a head start in the pseudo-capitalist Russia. Perestroika was a clever strategy for a ruling elite faced with a crumbling economy: the nomenklatura managed to maintain its position at the top of the social pyramid as stock brokers, bankers, factory bosses, and drug kingpins while conveniently changing ideological colors. 1 As Mikhail Zolotonosov succinctly puts it:
In 1987-1992 the nomenklatura engaged in a planned dismantling of socialism, implementing its grandiose scheme of privatization of “people’s property” … [Perestroika created] an illusion that it was precisely the … pressure of dissidents, the “words of truth” … that crushed the totalitarian monolyth. An evolution of censorship was interpreted as a collapse of the regime.2
Finally, while totalitarian repression has ended (since there are no more ideological dogmas that need to be defended from dissent), the material condition of the poor masses has not changed. Indeed, while a handful of perestroika’s winners have gained great wealth in the last decade due to increased business opportunities (unthinkable under the old regime), the majority of Russians have emerged from perestroika as losers. The convulsions of transition from socialism to capitalism have left millions unemployed, and will claim more victims as Government subsidies to inefficient stateowned enterprises continue to be scaled back. The savings of most families (who lacked the nomenklatura’s access to Swiss bank accounts) have been ravaged by inflation and investment scams, such as the MMM Fund. The rigid social structure remains the same: a truck driver’s daughter in Vladivostok has little chance of someday becoming a PhD in Moscow. The peasants, who aspired for privatization of land as a result of reform, have been largely frustrated. Gorbachev’s refusal to privatize land was a glaring indicator of perestroika’s insincerity. In China, Deng Xiaoping’s true reforms (which did benefit many layers of Chinese society) started with agrarian reform. The nomenklatura did not follow the Chinese example, for obvious reasons. Deng’s goal was to improve the people’s living conditions. Gorbachev’s goal was to restructure the system while preserving the elite’s stranglehold on the society and the economy. The rise of independent farmers would have imperiled that goal. The elite was not interested in competing with a new entrepreneurial class of landowners who would have acquired their status due to productivity and efficiency, not due to membership in a pre-ordained caste.
It is hardly surprising that the common people, who were initially deceived by perestroika and welcomed it, are now resentful of its end result – the regeneration of the same ruling elite, only in different packaging. KGB murderers who sent dissidents to die in the GULAG were never held accountable for their crimes. Instead, they got to keep money and power, while the standard of living of the poor masses has plummeted. The pseudo-capitalism imposed from above did not create new opportunities for the vast majority of the people; instead, it sent their previously stable and predictable (albeit not prosperous) existence into a tailspin. Should we be surprised by the anger of a Moscow factory worker, who is struggling to make ends meet, as he sees his former tormentors riding around in Mercedes?
Tenghiz Gudava crystallizes the people’s frustration by examining the key question: who has benefited from the events of the last decade? In his words,
… Soviet people were handed “free market” without competition and
“entrepreneurial spirit” without equal opportunities …. [They] saw mocking TV commercials…, green dollars in the bloody hands of KGB men and mafiosi, contract killings and speedy growth of poverty …. Some people spend vacations in Nice, while others cannot afford a ticket to Saratov … [And] while the lucky ones do not necessarily know how to read, they always have mafia connections and KGB roots. 3
In 1945, could the Allies have declared victory if SS officers and Nazi party officials were allowed to remain in power and preside over Germany’s economic rebirth? Similarly, the West’s delight with “victory over Communism” is near-sighted, for the Soviet ruling elite has hardly been defeated. In post-war West Germany, there was a Nuremberg Trial for the most egregious of Nazi wrongdoers, and a “denazification” process to weed out the rank-and-file Nazis from positions of power. There was also Allied occupation and financial assistance, which guaranteed survival of democracy. Of all these factors, the only one present in today’s post-Soviet Russia is Western financial aid. The wicked have not been punished; indeed, they have prospered. Russia also retains its nuclear arsenal. One can hardly cry “Victory!” when the alleged “loser” keeps holding a gun to the victor’s head.4
Perestroika has succeeded in ensuring survival of the ruling class in the face of economic crisis and failure of the Cold War strategy, perpetuating the nomenklatura’s grip on the country. It has also taken place with explicit blessing from the West, which provided financial assistance and did not contest nomenklatura’s retention of power. One can hardly blame Western decision-makers, whose sole area of concern was the removal of expansionist military threat that directly menaced their countries. They were not interested in overthrowing their Soviet colleagues; the outcome of economic upheaval in Russia was of no importance to the West, so long as the Cold War ended in an amicable cease-fire.
However, the people of Russia, whose living standards have plummeted and who remain trapped in a rigid social structure dominated by yesterday’s Communist nobility, do have a vital interest in the outcome. Obviously, they do not like what they see. Communism, for all its shortcomings, provided a stable livelihood — a guaranteed job, free education (which varied on the basis of parents’ social status, but did make exceptions for talented children), affordable housing and transportation, guaranteed access to free (albeit archaic) health care, and a pension in old age that, though not generous, did keep up with inflation (which was virtually non-existent).
All these guarantees are now gone. Instead, citizens can now console themselves by observing fancy goods they cannot afford in the windows of Moscow’s boutiques, and by relishing “freedom of speech” as they watch televised fistfights in the Parliament. Why should they vote for a continuation of reforms? Their resort to nationalism and Communism, though ironic, is not irrational. Reform has not brought swift justice to those who deserved it, nor has it changed the fundamental inequities of Russian society. The social pyramid has not been altered, nor could it be, by a different color on the national flag and a different face in the Kremlin. The alienation of the frustrated populace has reached boiling point.
II.
WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS TO RUSSIA’S CRISIS?
There is no easy way out of the dead-end in which Russia finds itself today. In an ideal world, the onset of capitalism should have been preceded by a popular revolution, an overthrow of the Communist regime, an expropriation of nomenklatura’s assets, a public examination of Communist crimes to ensure a clean break with the past, and privatization of land. However, this is not what happened. Can that revolution still take place today? Yes, but this reversal of perestroika and redistribution of property would necessarily entail mass terror against the nomenklatura, which will offer stubborn resistance. While this scenario may appeal to many Russians, and a popular movement advocating such measures may soon evolve, the benefits of social engineering accomplished with machine-guns are dubious. In 1917, the Russian masses, desiring to alter an unfair socio-economic structure, brought about Bolshevik dictatorship. In 1997, the ultimate outcome would be similar. An inevitable dictatorship would lead to the formation of a new ruling class. It is doubtful that this new “vanguard of the people” would endeavor to redistribute income equitably, once it consolidates its power.
The answer lies not in rebellion against the current social structure, concededly an unjust one. Russian people have no choice but to play the cards they have been dealt, as unfair as the card distribution may seem to many. A society presided by a corrupt government and dominated by a pervasive mafia (Italy) or by a few collusive cartels (Japan) is not inherently evil, and may indeed sustain long-term economic growth and the formation of a healthy middle class. From a long-term economic perspective, it is not important that the upper class consists of crooks and murderers, as long as they are not acting destructively vis-a-vis the nation, and are investing at least some of the proceeds of their activities in the nation’s industrial development, instead of spending them on Ferraris and Dom Perignon.
There are two key objectives that Russia must strive to achieve:
1) maintaining sustainable economic growth;
2) ensuring that some of that growth’s benefits trickle down to the masses.
The path to accomplishing these goals points to capitalism, capitalism, and more capitalism. Removal of artificial barriers to entry for domestic businessmen and foreign investors will bring more competition into the marketplace. A strong effort to combat organized crime should assist in diminishing its impact on healthy economic actors and their decision-making. Eventually, increased doses of true capitalism will lead to survival of the most efficient competitors; mafia snipers will not be an effective counterbalance to the long-run marginal cost curve of Boeing or Mazda. Even those nomenklatura entrepreneurs that do manage to stick around will be forced to compete in a true market, and will necessarily start making managerial decisions that benefit their own self-interest, which will coincide with the best interest of the nation’s economy.
The formula is simple, and it has worked across the world, be it in Belgium or in Taiwan. Capitalism’s virtue is that the pie keeps growing, and as more pieces of the pie get passed down to the lower classes, a middle class gradually develops. In Russia, an overdue privatization of land should spur the rise of a middle class of farmers; in the urban areas, a middle class of salaried employees will not be far behind. Special attention must be paid to assuring increased social mobility, primarily through improved educational opportunities to children of various social backgrounds.
Who among the current players on the Russian political landscape can be trusted to pursue this sound course? Definitely not Zyuganov’s Communists nor Zhirinovsky’s quasi-fascists. While Yavlinsky’s free market orientation offers the most promising approach, he may provoke dangerous social upheaval with “shock therapy.” As inadequate as many consider it, the current Government of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin is the best alternative on the shopping list. In the long run, their economic policies are likely to produce the desirable outcome outlined above.
However, voters tend to think in the short term, since “in the long run we’re all dead”, according to John Maynard Keynes. As December’s elections demonstrated, the Russian national conscience has not developed to the extent of comprehending the long-term benefits of continuing the current policies of reform. The patience of the poor masses has been exhausted, and the upcoming Presidential elections in June may well produce a run-off between the “two Z’s” as the two most popular candidates. Accordingly, should these elections be postponed in order to stave off catastrophe? William Satire does not think so:
Another way to stop the two Z’s would be to postpone elections. But democracy cannot be preserved by dictatorial means. Russian voters, who turned out in greater percentages than Americans, deserve the right to make their own mistakes.5
His opinion raises two fascinating questions: is there a democracy worthy of being preserved in today’s Russia? And, more importantly, is it democracy, and not Russia’s embryonic capitalism, that warrants most urgent attention and needs to be preserved?
III.
DOES RUSSIA NEED DEMOCRACY?
Democracy for democracy’s sake is not a goal worth fighting for. Rather, democracy should be viewed merely as a means to an end. The true goal of any political system should be the creation and constant improvement of adequate living conditions for the entire nation, as well as removal of obstacles to achieving this goal by most efficient means available in a given situation. Beneficial economic growth may well take place within the context of “dictatorial means”, as it has in Chile under Pinochet, in South Korea until the last decade, and in China under the current leadership. Even if we were concerned with survival of today’s Russian “democracy”, freedom of elections will not necessarily guarantee democracy’s success. Hitler rose to power in the 1930’s thanks to democratic elections. Sixty years later, Muslim fundamentalists in Algeria were about to do the same, until the army intervened and suspended the democratic process. Elections in post-Communist Eastern Europe have led to remarkable success of ex-Communists. These are just a few examples of consistent practice of democracy producing a suicidal result. The reason for such failures of democracy can be traced to the problem faced by the short-lived Weimar Republic in pre-Hitler Germany, wisely described by one observer as a “democracy without democrats”. Democracy is the only form of government whose survival depends on popular support; if the popular support disappears or is non-existent, democracy dies.
Because of its dependence on the support of its constituents, democracy is also the most fragile form of government. It gives people the inherent power to rebel without much punishment; thus it can only function in a society whose members have little to rebel against. Not surprisingly, stable democracies have mostly survived in rich countries that offered prolonged economic growth to their citizens. The sustained democratic development of the United States and Western Europe was made possible by a numerous and stable base of supporters: the middle class.
Why does the middle class back democracy? Because it has a material stake in the capitalist system. The owner of a house is not likely to start a riot which might cause his house to bum down. On the other hand, a crack addict living in a shelter is more likely to participate in a riot because he has nothing to lose. That is why typical outbreaks of violence in the developed capitalist world are incited by the poor and opposed by the middle class. That is why democracy and capitalism have often been used as interchangeable terms: one feeds off the other. Ownership of assets provides an incentive to support democracy.
It is therefore not surprising, as we review the history of modern democracies, to see that democracy evolved gradually, as economic growth allowed more people to join the middle class and become entrusted with the right to vote. In England, the birthplace of modern capitalist democracy, the right to vote was initially granted only to male property owners; its eventual expansion to include all males (universal manhood suffrage) was the topic of fervent debate. British women did not get the right to vote until 1928; in the United States, they got it in 1920, a century and a half after the Declaration of Independence. And only in the 1960’s were Blacks finally allowed to become full-fledged members of American society, although the nominal right to vote had been granted to them one century earlier.
The clear lesson of these histories is that capitalist economic development is a prerequisite for, not a result of, true democracy. The gradual growth of the middle class allowed governments to expand the right to vote to increasingly large portions of society without fear of destabilizing the political system. New social groups were only allowed to approach the ballot box when economic evolution permitted the society to integrate their demands. One cannot give the right to vote to a new class unless one is prepared to satisfy the social and economic demands of that class. In today’s Russia, whose struggling economy cannot even put a piece of bread on everyone’s table, the Government is clearly not prepared to accomodate the angry demands of the vast majority of the people. The universal right to vote is premature in a society whose level of development barely matches that of the West in the early 1900s.
Another feature of mature democracies is an uncanny ability to shrink the goalposts of freedom when necessary. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War. Strict censorship was imposed in warring nations during World War I. In post-war West Germany, the Communist party was banned for several decades. At the peak of the Cold War, McCarthyism raged in America. In danger, democratically elected governments have not hesitated to adapt by tightening their grip on power.
Is Russia currently capable of sustaining true democracy? No. There is no middle class, nor is one likely to develop in the immediate future. Safire is wrong when he proposes to give the immature Russian electorate “the right to make their own mistakes”. The stakes at this juncture, both for Russia and for the world at large, are simply too high; the margin for error, minimal. The Russian voters have lost tolerance for the long and painful road of reform upon which Y eltsin’s Government has embarked, even though Y eltsin’s economic policies are the only sound course available. It is these policies, and the strategic goal of economic development, that need to be preserved, by dictatorial means if necessary. The institutions of democracy, such as free elections, are obviously desirable but neither necessary nor helpful at this point. They must wait for the development of a socio-economic structure capable of supporting them.
The presidential elections scheduled in June must be, and will be, cancelled. Subsequent economic development in Russia will proceed under the auspices of a responsible dictatorship.
IV.
THE ROAD AHEAD
The dictatorship of Yeltsin or Chernomyrdin may ultimately be phased out and supplanted by a direct directorship of army generals, upon whom civilian government will inevitably come to rely in order to maintain control. Whoever eventually ends up with the reins of power will be confronted with choices of monumental importance to Russia’s future.
Russia’s economic development is currently at a crossroads. However, it cannot remain there much longer. A strategic choice between the quick fix of Keynesianism and the lengthy (and not appetizing in the short term) road of monetarism will determine whether Russian capitalism will have a chance to grow. That is the choice that divides the current Government and its hard-line “Z and Z” opponents; this choice will continue to torment the Government even after democracy is suspended.
What “Z and Z” offer is a return to irresponsible government spending, a slowdown of ruthless market forces, protectionism against foreign imports, and inflationary monetary policies. As all Keynesian recipes do, these policies may bring a short-term boost but would ruin any chance for long-term growth. Serious Russian economic thinkers are aware of this danger. Fortunately, they have had a chance to observe, and learn from, mistakes of the West. The lessons of France, the United Kingdom, and, increasingly, the United States, show that Keynesian policies can only take economic development so far. Ultimately, the effect of these policies weakens, since government spending cannot cure structural shifts of the global economy. While government indebtedness grows, unemployment levels cease to respond to desperate fiscal and monetary interventionism.
An economy that depends upon government spending for survival is akin to a drug addict. Initial doses produce powerful euphoria that lasts for prolonged periods. As the addiction grows, so does the need for greater and greater doses to achieve an incremental high, ever-dwindling in its duration. And as any healthy body will ultimately be ravaged and destroyed by drug addiction, so too, an economy chronically dependent upon continued injections of cash by the state will eventually stop functioning.
The other choice is a painful, yet prudent, process of gradual withdrawal of the state from economic life, manifested by tight monetary and fiscal policy and removal of barriers to foreign trade and investment. This approach is based on a belief that government intervention in the economy should be the exception, not the norm. A further development of these views may yield an economic ideology identical to the one adopted by Japanese leadership. Japan’s steady performance is largely due to a belief that the government’s role vis-a-vis the main private sector players should be that of a supportive servant, not that of a manipulative tyrant. 6
The lure of discredited Keynesian ideas will continue to tempt Russian rulers. The poor masses, unable to conduct reasoned economic analysis, will not stop pressing for reversal of reforms. Prudent decision-making may have to take place under the protection of tanks and helicopter gunships. Nationalist and Communist currents may ultimately crystallize into a formidable populist movement. Some of the ideas fueling this movement will not be without merit: desire for return of free elections, disgruntlement with social inequities, resentment of harmful economic effects of monetarist policies, and humiliation caused by the loss of the empire (something that millions of Russians have never accepted). This movement will incorporate anti-Western sentiments, because the populists will identify the West as an ally of the ruling elite and an opponent of Russian nationalism.
Populism will be the most severe obstacle that the dictatorship will have to address. Confrontations with substantial human casualties may be unavoidable. Regrettable though they will be, these casualties are a necessary price of economic progress for the whole nation. 7
In addition to internal challenges, the regime will face a deterioration of external relations with the West. What stance is the West likely to take as these events unfold? First, let us remember that the West is not Russia’s friend. The West’s primary concern is the preservation of its global economic and military hegemony. Since Russia remains, in the West’s eyes, the most dangerous potential challenger to that hegemony, a strong Russia is clearly not in the West’s interest. The best scenario for the West is a weak, fragmented Russia that exports raw materials, imports manufactured goods, and depends on Western financial handouts. The long-term goals of Russian economic development are therefore structurally incongruent with Western long-term interests. By developing competitive modern industries, Russia will inevitably threaten Western export markets.8
Another inevitable area of conflict will arise when Russia will seek to reassert its dominance in ex-Soviet republics of the “near abroad”, be it in the name of protecting ethnic Russian minorities and vital transportation lines, or as an overt attempt to extend Moscow’s geopolitical reach in a military conflict. These tensions will not be fatal to Russia’s relationship with the West; after some vociferous protests, the West will back down. Americans barely can be motivated to send 20,000 troops into Bosnia; it is hard to envision Washington risking a nuclear shootout over the fate of Latvians or Turkmens. However, the tensions will leave a bitter taste in both sides’ mouths.
A final area of conflict may be ideological. It would not match the intensity of the Cold War, since Russian rulers will not advance any competing ideology that could threaten the West. Indeed, they will be advocating an establishment of a free market economy. However, the West would not easily forgive the dictatorship for its abrupt termination of the democratic process. This dogmatic disapproval would stem from a naive feature of American foreign policy: a stern belief that the bad should be punished and the good should be rewarded. While such an approach would be correct in a kindergarten, it is hardly appropriate for the global chessboard.
To compensate for its worsening rapport with the West, Moscow may well look to the East. An alliance with China will become increasingly likely. The two countries are undergoing the same economic process; China is slightly ahead, but Russia has greater potential. There are no inherent conflicts in the global outlooks of these two nations. Separately, each is a giant with great promise, yet with many hurdles to overcome. Together, the two would constitute a formidable partnership.
Since Russia, under any leadership, stands little chance of ever being accepted into the European club of nations, or of establishing a trans-Atlantic partnership with America, it may well suit Russia’s best interests to push for a formation of a trading bloc with China, South Korea, and perhaps even Japan.
Ultimately, it is South Korea and Japan that Russia should observe as a model for its development. Both countries, despite limited resources, have emerged as two of the hottest economic powers at the dawn of the third millenium. They have done so by pursuing a path distinct from the one which took Western nations centuries to travel, and have achieved better results in a shorter timespan. Both nations rely on a disciplined civic culture of consensual collectivism, rather than the Western pluralistic individualism. Their example deserves closer scrutiny by Russia’s leaders as they embark on a voyage in uncharted waters.
Vadim Mahmoudov
January 7, 1996
*****
1 Abandoning Communist ideology was an easy trick for the nomenklatura, which was never loyal to Marxist dogmas or Russian imperialism to begin with. The only objective that consistently concerned the Soviet elite was maintaining its personal wealth and power.
2Mikhail Zolotonosov, “A timely conclusion”, in Novoye Russkoye Slovo [Russian Daily] (New York), January 5, 1996, p. 16 [translation mine].
3Tenghiz Gudava, “Here comes New Year”, in Novoye Russkoye Slovo [Russian Daily] (New York), December 29, 1995, pp. 10-1 l [translation mine].
4 The withdrawal of Soviet troops from former colonies is of little significance. When African nationalists chased away their Western conquerors in the 1960’s, they oddly realized that their economies remain inextricably dependent on the West. Similarly, Russia continues to exert substantial control over the former U.S.S.R. republics, whose economies are not self-sufficient. Furthermore, in almost every instance, these republics are being ruled by ex-Communists who have donned nationalist hats.
5William Safire, “And on Earth, Freedom” in New York Times, December 25, 1995.
6Of course, Russian economic decision-makers would also benefit from Japan’s experience with selective state intervention in strategically important areas. Vital Russian industries should be shielded from foreign competitition until they are ready to become bona fide players in the global marketplace.
7 Parallels can be drawn between this upcoming showdown in Red Square and the massacre that took place in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Whatever our judgment of the Chinese leadership’s decision may be, it is evident that the bloodbath has not affected China’s non-stop economic growth and the rapid development of an entrepreneurial middle class. A fatal similarity between the Chinese students and the Russian populists will be that their demands are justified, yet not timely: democracy is a noble but premature idea for their nations.
8 It is arguable that the plundering of Russian natural resources and the destructive self-enrichment of the nomenklatura is not incongruent with the West’s long-term interests. Not surprisingly, the West has not shown any hostility against the retention of economic power by ex-Communists.
